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HOW POSITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
AFFECTED EUROPE’S DECISION TO OPPOSE
AND THEN ADOPT EMISSIONS TRADING
BRETTNY HARDY†
I. INTRODUCTION
The politics of international environmental regulation can be
mystifying. As one scholar, Jonathan Wiener, has noted,
environmental regulation is often difficult to explain at the domestic
level.1 It becomes even more baffling when environmental regulation
reaches a global scale.2 The international management of global
warming is no exception.
Currently, greenhouse gas pollution that causes global warming
is one of the biggest environmental problems facing regulators. It is
international in scope and effect. Most scientists agree that global
warming is a dangerous threat that can potentially destabilize the
4
planet if managers do not take action soon.
The international community has been aware of the threat of
global warming for decades. The first international treaty to combat

† Brettny Hardy is a J.D. candidate at Duke Law School and an M.E.M. candidate at the
Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences at Duke University. She would like to
thank Jonathan Wiener for his valuable advice and never-ending patience throughout the
writing process.
1. See generally Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global
Environmental Regulation, 87 GEORGETOWN L.J., 749 (1999).
2. Id.
4. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL FINGERPRINTS OF GREENHOUSE
WARMING: A SUMMARY OF RECENT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (2006), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
Pew%20Center%5FGlobal%20Fingerprints%5F3%2E06%2Epdf;
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS:
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (Feb.
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf; Juliet Eilperin, Debate on Climate Shifts
to Issue of Irreparable Change, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1.
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global warming, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), was signed in 1992 and went into effect
5
in 1994. Since that time, however, countries have had a hard time
agreeing on the best solution to reduce greenhouse gases. The
United States initially pushed for international emissions trading as
the best approach. More recently for the United States, however,
inaction has become the norm when it comes to global warming.
Legislators have hesitated to proceed authoritatively, fearing that no
plan will decrease global emissions in a way that protects the U.S.
economy.6
The European Union (E.U.), on the other hand, has become one
of the biggest proponents for trading. In 2005, the European Union
launched a greenhouse gas Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the
7
largest emission trading program in the world. The trading system is
a market solution to greenhouse gas emissions. Governments set a
cap for overall emissions, but allow industry to trade allowances in an
open market, so that the emitters with the most efficient means of
reducing pollution act first.8
Even so, the E.U. has not historically championed emissions
trading. At first, the European Commission did not favor a market
approach to global warming, but instead supported a uniform
emissions tax for polluters. In fact, the E.U. rejected the notion of an
9
ETS even up until 1999. But once European managers caught on to
the idea of emissions trading, they did not hesitate to prepare and
10
institute a global market for greenhouse gas emissions.
In some ways, the E.U.’s reaction to global warming aligns with
its typically proactive stance in the face of risk. Many commentators
have noted that Europe often acts quickly and informally to tackle
5. Lavanya Rajamani, Re-Negotiating Kyoto: A Review of the Sixth Conference of Parties
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2000 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 201,
202-03.
6. Instead of enacting regulatory measures to decrease greenhouse gases, the United
States has chosen to rely on voluntary reductions from businesses. The United States has also
encouraged the development of cleaner technologies. Miranda A. Schreurs, The Climate
Change Divide: The European Union, the United States, and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol, in
GREEN GIANTS?: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION 207, 219-22 (Norman J. Vig & Michael G. Faure eds., 2004).
7. Susan J. Kurkowski, Note, Distributing the Right to Pollute in the European Union:
Efficiency, Equity, and the Environment, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 698, 699 (2006).
8. Joe Kruger & Christian Egenhofer, Confidence Through Compliance in Emissions
Trading Markets, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y Winter 2006 (Vol. VI) 2, 2.
9. See infra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
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environmental issues without worrying about whether a solution will
exactly fit the problem.11 But, the trading scheme does not completely
conform to European ideology. Europe has not often favored market
solutions for environmental problems, relying instead on actions that
control pollution from the top down.12 The E.U. performed an
extreme about-face when it shifted its focus from a command and
control approach (e.g. tax) to a cap-and-trade solution. Something
that was initially unpleasant”” for Europe became the ideal solution
almost overnight.
The E.U.’s new ETS thus presents some interesting questions.
What caused Europe to change its mind so quickly regarding the best
solution for global warming? Did political factors cause Europe to
act too fast in developing its emissions trading program instead of
fully evaluating the costs and benefits to ensure that its trading
approach would provide the best solution? This paper attempts to
address these questions by first considering the political climate
surrounding the E.U.’s sudden change of heart and then analyzing the
E.U.’s assessment of its emissions trading program. I argue that
Europe’s decision to invest in emissions trading involved a number of
factors, but largely arose because it was a way for Europe to gain
advantages over other countries in the global greenhouse gas market.
Further, rent-seeking politics may not have led Europe toward the
perfect solution “”with emissions trading, but the E.U. has fully
invested itself into the ETS process, constantly readjusting its
program when it finds problems.
Part II will briefly outline the history leading up to the
implementation of ETS in Europe. Part III will discuss the reasons
why the E.U. suddenly changed its preferences. Part IV will describe
the emissions trading scheme. Part V will address the potential

11. See Ludwig Kraemer, Development of Environmental Policies in the U.S. and Europe:
Convergence or Divergence, in GREEN GIANTS?: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 55 (Norman J. Vig & Michael G. Faure eds., 2004). To be
sure, the European Union does not always act swiftly in the face of environmental uncertainty.
The reality of European action is much more complex when analyzed on a closer level. See
generally Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 207
(2003).
12. Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal
Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the
European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 865, 896-97 (2005) (describing the general preference among the European
public for pollution taxes over emissions trading).
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problems and pitfalls of Europe’s approach. Finally, Part VI will
discuss whether Europe acted too quickly.
II. THE ROAD LEADING UP TO THE E.U. ETS
In 2003, the E.U. adopted a directive to initiate emissions trading
within the E.U. and in 2005, the E.U. was the first state to officially
13
Today,
begin operating an ETS for greenhouse gas emissions.
Europe is one of the biggest proponents of a global trading market as
14
a way to alleviate global warming. But the E.U. has not always been
in favor of trading. During most of the 1990s, the E.U. adamantly
opposed market mechanisms as environmental regulatory options.
After the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) went into effect in 1994, the E.U. attempted to
block emissions trading as a method to reduce greenhouse gas
pollution. At the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) to the
UNFCCC in 1995, Japan, Canada, the United States, Australia, and
New Zealand lobbied for the inclusion of emissions trading which
15
would allow states flexibility in meeting UNFCCC targets.
European countries stood in opposition to those proposals, preferring
16
hard-nosed approaches like a community-wide carbon tax. During
negotiations at subsequent COPs, the United States and others
continued to push for emissions trading as a cost-effective way of
combating global warming, but the E.U. continued to oppose such
mechanisms.
Even as late as 1997, just before the negotiations in Kyoto, the
insistence on emissions trading by the U.S. ‘was met with caution
from most European countries’ because they ‘feared that trading
might provide a cheap way for the U.S., Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand to ‘buy’ themselves out of their obligations’ and
because there was ‘a certain mistrust of such concepts by
17
continental European countries.’

13. Catherine Boemare, Philippe Quirion, & Steve Sorrell, The Evolution of Emissions
Trading in the E.U.: Tensions Between National Trading Schemes and the Proposed E.U.
Directive, 3S2 CLIMATE POL’Y S105, S106 (2003).
14. See Atle C. Christiansen & Jørgen Wettestad, The E.U. as a Frontrunner on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: How Did it Happen and Will the E.U. Succeed?, 3
CLIMATE POL’Y 3, 4 (2003).
15. Atle C. Christiansen, The Role of Flexibility Mechanisms in E.U. Climate Strategy:
Lessons Learned and Future Challenges., 4 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 27,
28 (2004).
16. Id.
17. Edwin Woerdman, Path-Dependant Climate Policy: The History and Future of
Emissions Trading in Europe, 14 EUR. ENV’T 261, 262 (2004) (quoting S. OBERTHÜR & H.E.
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During the negotiations in Kyoto, however, the E.U. eventually
conceded to make trading a part of the Kyoto Protocol in order to
gain concessions from the United States and Russia concerning
emissions targets.18 Although the E.U. continued to limit the use of
emissions trading after the Kyoto Protocol was opened for signature
19
in 1997, there were signs that the E.U. was changing its position.
In 1998, the European Environment Commissioner noted that
the E.U. needed to get involved in emissions trading so that other
20
countries did not entirely “dictate the rules.” A communication also
noted that it might be possible for the E.U. to establish its own
21
trading system by 2005. In 1999, another communication alluded to
the cost-savings of a broad and comprehensive trading system.22 But,
it was not until 2000 that the E.U. formally broadcast its acceptance
of emissions trading. The E.U. issued a Green Paper that outlined
several options for initiating a full trading system.23 Then in 2001, the
Commission issued a formal directive with a proposal for a
mandatory system that would allow the trading of carbon dioxide
emissions between several industrial sectors.24 The Council of
Environmental Ministers upheld the proposal in 2002, and the
25
Parliament endorsed the proposal with some minor changes in 2003.
E.U. action on emissions trading was relatively fast. After the
E.U. issued a proposal for trading, the final directive outlining a plan
for the E.U. ETS was finalized only two years later. What’s more
surprising is that the ETS gained approval so quickly, considering that
the E.U. had spent many years in efforts to oppose the plan.
III. REASONS FOR THE ABOUT-FACE
During the past decade, the E.U. has evolved from an enemy of
cap-and-trade to a frontrunner in emissions trading. The change in
E.U. policy is noteworthy both for the speed with which it happened

OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 18890 (1999))
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Jørgen Wettestad, The Making of the 2003 E.U. Emissions Trading Directive: An UltraQuick Process Due to Entrepreneurial Proficiency, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Feb. 2005, at 1, 3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id. at 4-5
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and because it resulted in a complete reversal of policy for the E.U.
This section will address how this regulatory about-face happened so
quickly and the reasons behind the change, briefly summarizing some
of the conditions surrounding E.U. action when it instituted an
emissions trading approach.
A. Failure of the Carbon Tax
One of the main reasons the E.U. began supporting an emissions
trading program is that the carbon tax program it had initially
proposed did not have political support. In the early 1990s, the
European Commission supported a tax partly because it was difficult
for the Commission to ensure uniform implementation and
26
compliance of regulations throughout Europe. The thinking was
that European governments might have an incentive to oversee a tax
27
if individual governments could derive revenues as a result. By the
time the Kyoto negotiations began, however, efforts to implement a
tax through the European Council of Ministers had failed. A carbon
tax did not have support from industry or from certain key European
nations like the U.K. and Spain.28
This may have been because a carbon tax provided less flexibility
for member states. A carbon tax would have been uniform across
Europe in order to create efficiency for the E.U., but E.U. members
have varying amounts of pollution and wealth. A tax would impose
the same on all countries, rich and poor. Moreover, some members
would have been paying a great deal more in taxes than others. Using
a trading scheme would improve flexibility. Under cap-and-trade, the
E.U. could set one overall cap on emissions, but allocate allowances
to each country based on its individual emissions. The E.U. could
grant poorer countries more allowances to soften differences in
economic impact across member states. Furthermore, trading meant
less pressure on industry if the allowances were initially issued for
free, whereas a tax (or auctioned allowances) charges industry for all
residual emissions.
It should also be noted that when the E.U. started to investigate
the possibility of taxes, there were only fifteen member states within
the E.U. By the time the ETS was introduced, there were twenty-five
members (now there are twenty-seven). More member states meant

26. Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note 8, at 3.
27. Id..
28. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 8.
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a greater number of emissions sources. There is some evidence that
market mechanisms are more attractive to regulators as the number
29
of regulated sources increase. This could be because more sources
means a bigger market and more options in terms of trading for the
participants. A command and control system is easier to administer
when there is homogeneity in the market which is more likely with a
smaller number of emitters.30 When the composition of the E.U.
changed, it could also have altered the key players involved in
negotiations shifting preferences towards emission trading.
Once the Kyoto Protocol was signed, it became clear that an
emissions trading scheme was going to happen in the future, because
it was an integral component of the Protocol. Under Kyoto, the E.U.
had committed to an eight percent reduction of 1990 emission levels
by 2012. In order to meet its targets, the E.U. would need a common
31
policy. Some E.U. member States like the U.K. and Denmark had
already begun to develop emissions trading programs in their
32
countries. To ensure that all the European nations could operate on
a level playing field and to avoid fragmentation, it made sense for the
E.U. to change its focus from a top down to a bottom up approach.33
The E.U. could set up its own trading rules that would apply to the
entire European bubble. This harmonization would allow Europe to
set the pace for a global trading scheme. At the same time, a flexible
market would permit individual nations to retain control over their
own trading programs.34
B. Industrial Influence
In addition to the E.U.’s need to reject its tax initiatives, there
was a strong pull from the industrial sector to implement an emissions
trading program. Although the industry was not enthusiastic about a
carbon tax, they began to support market approaches like cap-andtrade in the late 1990s.35 Signaling that trading markets could be

29. See Katrina Wyman, Why Regulators Turn to Tradable Permits: A Canadian Case
Study, 52 U. Toronto L.J. 419, 497-99 (2002) (describing how governments tend to turn to
market mechanisms as the number of pollution sources increase).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Woerdman, supra note 17, at 262.
33. Christiansen & Wettestad, supra note 14, at 7.
34. See PETER ZAPFEL & MATTI VAINIO, PATHWAYS TO EUROPEAN GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS TRADING HISTORY AND MISCONCEPTIONS 10-11 (2002).
35. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 10.
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feasible in large industrial sectors, two major oil companies, BP and
Shell, even started their own internal emissions trading markets in
36
1998 and 2000, respectively. Furthermore, major non-governmental
organizations supported emissions trading schemes in favor of
uniform taxes. Overall, there was “general support for emissions
trading from a majority of business and industry groups across the
E.U.”37
C. Symbolic Politics
Perhaps the most jarring event to occur during the E.U.’s
decision-making process was the United States’ decision to officially
withdraw from Kyoto negotiations in March of 2001.38 U.S. departure
meant that the E.U. could become a major entrepreneur in the
formation of a global trading market.39 Without the United States in
the game, the E.U. could step into the forefront and condemn U.S.
politics by posing itself as the champion of the environment.
The United States’ rejection of international efforts also may
have united European nations as common allies in the battle against
41
global warming. If the E.U. could implement an ETS, it might serve
to rebuild international momentum. If an emissions trading scheme
became a success, it could even possibly entice the United States to
rejoin the international negotiation table.42 The European Union
could use an ETS as a diplomatic tool in the future.
D. Internal E.U. Politics
Many external factors influenced the E.U. to adopt emissions
trading, but internal dynamics also played a role. In the late 1990s
and early part of the 21st Century, central commission officials within
the Directorate General Environment (DG ENV) started to support
emissions trading. One Commissioner, Jos Delbeke, was frustrated
by the failure of the carbon tax, and he strongly desired to make

36. Id.
37. Christiansen & Wettestad, supra note 14, at 9.
38. ZAPFEL & VAINIO, supra note 34, at 12.
39. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 16.
41. ZAPFEL & VAINIO, supra note 34, at 12.
42. See Christiansen & Wettestad, supra note 14, at 41; see also David M. Driesen, Free
Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, *27 (1998).
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emissions trading a success.43 Peter Zapfel, who had studied
emissions trading in the United States, joined the Commission in
44
1998. Additionally, the commission received feedback from legal
advisors and working groups that an emissions trading program could
allow the E.U. to “exert control over the climate policy process and
45
pull the E.U. together.”
Favorable internal politics also allowed the Commission to
transform emissions trading from a proposal to a formal directive in
only two years. In comparison to the carbon tax, the flexibility and
cost-effectiveness that an emissions trading scheme promised made it
easier for DG ENV to sell their plan to DG Competition and DG
46
Enterprise. Furthermore, because only a few E.U. member states
had started to initiate trading programs on their own, the fear that an
47
E.U. plan might clash with state initiatives was minimal. Even for
those who may have opposed particular components of emissions
trading, building a majority would have been difficult due to the
complexity and breadth of the plan.48 Finally, the commission wisely
left controversial decisions about caps and allocations with member
states rather than debating them within the commission.49
E. Learning from U.S. Experience
Another factor that influenced the European Union’s change of
heart was the learning process it underwent throughout its
participation in the Kyoto process. The United States first introduced
the idea of emissions trading during Kyoto negotiations as a way to
50
address climate change. The White House asked the Department of
Justice to compile a report that would detail the advantages of
emissions trading based on U.S. experience with trading programs.51
The final Kyoto Protocol included emissions trading guidelines that
52
were based on advice from U.S. negotiators. In essence, Kyoto
43. Id. at 6; Wettestad, supra note 20, at 12.
44. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 12.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 13.
47. See id. at 13-15.
48. See id. at 13. (citing “declining disagreement” within the Commission because of “push
and pull” factors in the proposal and a U.S. “pull-out of the global process”).
49. Id. at 14.
50. Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and
the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1310-1311 (2001).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1312-13.
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borrowed the legal concept of emissions trading from U.S. national
experience. In much the same way, the E.U. was able to borrow the
legal structures for trading from both Kyoto and U.S. advisors when
designing its own national emissions trading scheme.53
In addition, the European Commissioners consulted directly with
U.S. economists about the potential for a trading market in
54
Experts with real-life experience in
greenhouse gas emissions.
trading markets were able to give the E.U. advice about the strength
55
and pitfalls of cap-and-trade systems. Because the clean air trading
schemes for SO2 and NOx in the United States had already been a
success, the E.U. was also more willing to listen to U.S.
56
recommendations. Additionally, much had been written about the
trading programs that were already in existence. The E.U. could use
those materials in designing its own ETS. Although the E.U. had
been skeptical of trading systems in the past, concrete knowledge
about the benefits of cap-and-trade systems may have sparked the
E.U. to change its mind.
Overall, there were a number of factors that may have influenced
the E.U. to shift its focus from a tax scheme to an emissions trading
market, including public perception and economic shifts. However, it
appears that the E.U. decided to embrace emission trading largely
because it could realize gains for its industry and for its political
leaders, both internally and in the eyes of the international
community.
The question still remains, however, whether the political process
that caused the E.U. to make such a rapid policy shift will also result
in environmental benefits. Before discussing the effectiveness of the
ETS, it is important to present the trading scheme in more detail.
IV. THE EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME
Whether all or some of the above factors influenced the E.U. to
support cap-and-trade, the E.U. was finally ready to adopt a formal
ETS in 2003. The E.U.’s ETS is a groundbreaking environmental
achievement. It incorporates twenty-five countries, six different
industry sectors, and about 12,000 individual sources of carbon
53. For a thorough discussion of the concept of legal borrowing, see Jonathan B. Wiener,
Better Regulation in Europe in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2006, VOL. 59 (eds. Jane Holder &
Colm O’Cinneide); see also Wiener, supra note 50.
54. Id. at 16.
55. Christiansen, supra note 14, at 6.
56. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 16.
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dioxide emissions.57 No other cap-and-trade system in history has
been so large and covered so many different pollution sources.58 In
comparison, the U.S. acid rain trading program for SO2 only covers
one industrial sector and about 3,000 sources of pollution. The U.S.
NOx trading system only covers two industrial sectors and about 2,400
59
It is with good reason that critics have
sources of pollution.
questioned whether the E.U. jumped into the ring too soon.60
Assuring a successful ETS is going to be difficult due to the novelty of
the program. Before discussing the potential pitfalls of an ETS,
however, this section will give a brief overview of the E.U. ETS—
what it covers and the details of the program.61
Overall, the E.U. ETS is a flexibility mechanism that promotes
the use of energy efficient technology and facilitates trading in order
to help E.U. member states in reaching their Kyoto targets.62 The
E.U. ETS is set to run in phases. The first phase officially started in
January of 2005 and is set to run until 2007. After that, the ETS will
run in successive five-year phases.63 At the end of every phase, the
E.U. will review the process and make amendments.64 During the
first phase, the ETS will only cover large industrial sectors.65
Additionally, the only greenhouse gas that can be traded on the
66
market in the first phase is CO2. However, the E.U. will likely
57. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME (E.U.-ETS): INSIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2006), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/document.cfm?
documentID=440 [hereinafter E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME].
58. Id. at 4; Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change Policies and Ocean Apart: E.U. & U.S.
Climate Change Policies Compared, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 464 (2006).
59. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 4.
60. See generally Wettestad, supra note 20.
61. ETS is only one part of the larger E.U. climate change program. The climate change
program is an umbrella program that “sets minimum emission reduction requirements for its
member states [and] also provides a forum for community-wide coordination, voluntary
programs, and trading schemes.” Carlarne, supra note 58, at 460. The entire climate change
program includes voluntary agreements between the E.U. and European, Japanese, and Korean
car manufacturers to produce cleaner automobiles, directives to target energy efficiency through
best technology deployment, as well as regulations for pollution and landfills among other
things. Id. at 461. This paper will only focus on the ETS within the larger climate change
program.
62. See generally Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC); see also Carlarne,
supra note 58, at 464.
63. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57 at 7.
64. Joseph Kruger & William Pizer, Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe, 46
ENVIRONMENT 1, 8-10 (2004).
65. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57 at 7.
66. Id.
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incorporate more sectors and more greenhouse gases during later
phases.67
The E.U. ETS incorporates six industrial sectors which cover a
range of installations, including electricity and heat production plants
with greater than 20MW capacity, oil refineries, coke ovens, metal,
ore, and steel installations, cement kilns, glass and ceramics
manufacturing plants, and paper, pulp, and board mills.68 In total,
these industries embody about half of the total CO2 emissions in the
E.U. Notable industries which are not covered in the first phase but
may be included later are transportation and building energy.
At its core, the ETS is a system that facilitates the trade of CO2
allowances. There are a fixed amount of allowances which are
distributed to firms at the beginning of every phase and can be traded
during that phase.69 Firms must relinquish an allowance for every ton
of CO2 emitted each year.70 Individual E.U. member states determine
the amount of allowances to be distributed in each state and the
71
They are also required to establish
method of distribution.
electronic registries for allowances. The commission oversees all the
72
registries and monitors for irregularities. Each member state must
detail their allocation decisions in a National Allocation Plan (NAP)
that is submitted to the European Commission before the start of
each phase. The Commission reviews and analyzes all the NAPs
based on eleven criteria including technical aspects, targets, and
competition.73 Although some Member States did not submit their
NAPs to the E.U. before the start of the first phase on January 1,
74
2005, at this time, NAPs from all twenty-five states participating in
the first phase have been submitted and approved, albeit with some
75
modifications. Although banking of excesses allowances is allowed
from year to year during the first phase, whether firms can bank from
one phase to the next is left to member state discretion.76

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See generally Kruger & Pizer, supra note 64.
E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57 at 7.
Id.
Id.
Carlarne, supra note 58, at 464.
See generally Kruger & Pizer, supra note 64.
Carlarne, supra note 58, at 464.
E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 10.
Carlarne, supra note 58, at 464-65.
E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 7-8.
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Under the ETS, firms have the ability to opt—out of the ETS if
they are using equivalent means to achieve reductions.77 Instead of
applying to entire sectors, the opt-out option only applies to
78
individual installations, and can only be used during the first phase.
Firms are also able to pool installations within sectors if they want to
79
work together to meet industry targets. Additionally, member states
are able to opt-in additional sources and sectors that are not already
covered in the ETS.80
The ETS lays out guidelines for monitoring, reporting, and
verification of compliance.81
The guidelines describe different
methodologies that are ordered in tiers based on degrees of
82
accuracy. Although installations are supposed to use the top tier
methodologies, they may petition member states to use
83
methodologies from the lower tiers if they show that it is necessary.
All self-reported emissions must be verified by an independent third
party.84 Member states may require, however, that firms provide
private third party verification in order to reduce the burden on
85
government resources.
The penalties are large if a firm emits more CO2 than is covered
by its allowances—forty Euro per ton of CO2 emitted in the first
phase and 100 Euro per ton after that.86 Firms are also required to
make up missed reductions in the following year. During the first
87
phase, however, there is one relief. The European Commission can
decide to issue additional, non-transferable allowances to a firm with
unusually high emissions if there is a “force majeure” set of
circumstances, or an act of God beyond the firm’s control.88
Finally, the E.U. has issued a directive that will allow the E.U. to
link its ETS to other trading schemes and also to project mechanisms

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Joseph Kruger, FROM SO2 TO GREENHOUSE GASES: TRENDS AND EVENTS SHAPING
FUTURE EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2005), available at
http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-05-20.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 14-15.
84. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 8.
85. Kruger, supra note 81, at 15.
86. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 8.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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of the Kyoto Protocol like the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) and the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM).89 The E.U.
can link to other trading schemes through bilateral agreements. At
this time, no linkages to other schemes have been finalized under the
directive90 although Norway has agreed to link its trading program to
the E.U. ETS under the European Economic Area Agreement and is
91
currently awaiting approval from Iceland and Liechtenstein.
As for the Kyoto mechanisms, firms can use credits from
developing countries under the CDM in the first phase and firms can
use credits from other countries under the JIM starting in the second
92
phase. There is no limit to the CDM credits in the first phase, but
after that member states will decide how many CDM and JIM credits
they will allow in their NAPs. 93
V. POTENTIAL PITFALLS
The E.U. ETS is the first of its kind. It is the largest cap-and94
It also utilizes a decentralized
trade program in world history.
approach for the setting of caps and the allocation of allowances, as
well as the monitoring of industry emissions, something that is
relatively novel for cap-and-trade programs.95 As a result, the E.U.
ETS has been widely criticized.96 This section will briefly summarize
the major criticisms of the E.U. ETS and potential future pitfalls for
the program.
One of the most controversial features of the E.U. ETS is that it
leaves decisions about caps and allocation to member states. Leaving
such important decisions to the discretion of member states can be
dangerous for a number of reasons. First, they might be influenced
by political pressure to grant more allowances to industry than they
should, meaning less emissions reduction than is needed to meet

89. Council Directive 2004/101/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18.
90. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 8.
91. Press Release, The Norwegian Government Accepts to Include the EU Emissions
Trading
Directive
in
the
EEA
Agreement
(March
2006),
available
at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/md/Press-Centre/Press-releases/2006/Norway-accept-EUEmissions-Trading-Directive.html?id=419857.
92. Id. at 8-9.
93. Id. at 9.
94. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
95. See Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note 8, at 6.
96. See, e.g., Richard N. Cooper, Alternatives to Kyoto: The Case for a Carbon Tax (Nov.
9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/
cooper/papers/Kyoto_ct.pdf.
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Kyoto targets.97 There is some evidence that member states have
already over-allocated emissions so much that they might have
98
difficulty meeting the reductions required under Kyoto.
Second, member states may try to game the system by granting a
large number of allowances to one particular industry in order to gain
99
a competitive advantage in that industry over other member states.
This would be similar to the race to the bottom scenario that is often
described when discretion for environmental regulation is left to
states of the United States.100 The fear is that states will race to
institute the least friendly environmental regulations in order to
101
In the case of the E.U. ETS, such
attract industry to the state.
gaming may create industry losers who do not have the resources to
effectively lobby member state governments for allowances.
Additionally, it may again lead to over-allocation for particular
industries.
Third, not all E.U. member states have the institutional capacity
102
to effectively allocate and monitor allowances. There will likely be
some variability amongst member states in terms of how vigorously
103
Large differences between
they enforce emissions regulations.
member states may create inconsistencies that undermine the E.U.
ETS by creating an uneven playing field, thus threatening the
efficiency of the program.104 Member states may also differ as to how
they accredit third-party verifiers.105 Already, differences exist
between member states regarding the rules for accreditation and
106
If verification differences are significant, allowances
verification.
could become less valuable because the enforcement of the rights that
accompany allowances will be unpredictable.
Another potential pitfall of the E.U. ETS is the process of
submitting and reviewing NAPs, which has been an “extremely high
profile and contentious process.”107 Because of the above-described
97. Kurkowski, supra note 7, at 710-11; Kruger, supra note 81, at 15.
98. Kurkowski, supra note 7, at 711-16, 717-23.
99. Id.; Kruger, supra note 81, at 15.
100. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 Ecology L.Q. 183, 201-02 (2005).
101. Id.
102. Kruger, supra note 81, at 15.
103. Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note 8, at 11.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. E.U. ETS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 57, at 12.
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problems, the European Commission has had to reject NAPs from
some member states and has even had to threaten legal action in
order to encourage them to speed up the process of making allocation
decisions.108 The difficulty in creating NAPs could cause member
states to expend extra administrative costs in order to implement an
ETS.
In the long run, member states might even become
disenfranchised with the entire program.
Aside from the NAPs, another worry concerning the E.U. ETS is
the potential for “hot air”, a term to describe empty allowances which
109
A potential
do not actually result in any decrease in emissions.
110
The
source for hot air might come from the Russian Federation.
Kyoto Protocol granted Russia extra allowances to sell as an incentive
to join Kyoto.111 Although the extra allowances are not recognized in
the E.U. ETS, member states can still purchase credits from Russia in
112
As a result, member states could
order to meet Kyoto targets.
commit to fewer reductions within the ETS program if they are able
to meet Kyoto targets using Russian credits.
The E.U.’s decision to grandfather allowances instead of
auctioning them has also been controversial. In the first phase,
member states are only allowed to auction up to five percent of
113
allowances; in the second phase, only ten percent may be auctioned.
The grandfathering of most of the permits means that current
emitters will receive free allowances based on a percentage of their
current emissions, rather than having to purchase the allowances
114
Under this system, new industrial installations
during an auction.
will have a difficult time entering the market. New entrants will
typically have equal footing with old emitters in a cap-and-trade
market if both are forced to purchase allowances at an auction.115 An
imbalance emerges in the E.U. ETS system because new entrants will
largely be forced to purchase allowances while old emitters will get

108. Id.
109. Id. at 14-15.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Choi, supra note 12, at 920.
114. Id.
115. Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, 14 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 251, 270-73 (2006).
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allowances for free. Member governments may also be losing out on
potential revenues that could be derived from auctions.116
VI. DID THE E.U. MOVE TOO FAST?
Considering all the criticism surrounding the E.U. ETS and its
high profile status in the international community, it is logical to ask
whether the positive politics that caused the E.U. to rapidly adopt
emissions trading may have resulted in environmental losses . As
stated above, the European Commission turned the ETS from a
proposal to a directive at a quick pace. The Commission went from
being an enemy of emissions trading to one of its biggest supporters
at the same break-neck speed. Nevertheless, the E.U. has not
embarked on this unique cap-and-trade program completely blindfolded. The E.U. conducted considerable reviews of the emissions
trading process before the official start of the ETS and it has
continued those reviews during the two years that it has been in
operation.
To begin with, it is important to remember that the E.U. was not
working off a blank slate when it started to consider emissions trading
in the late 1990s. Emissions trading programs had already been
successful in reducing SO2 and NO2 in the United States. Many
countries had also used cap-and-trade and permit systems to manage
117
Out of these
a wide variety of resources from fisheries to water.
programs grew a large amount of research on flexible market
118
mechanisms as an alternative for environmental regulation.
Considerable amounts of scholarship and commentary also existed on
the costs and benefits as well as the uncertainties associated with
different facets of trading systems.119 In reality, the E.U. had a wide
array of knowledge to utilize when it designed its own ETS.
In addition to the research that already existed on other trading
systems, before issuing a final directive the E.U. commissioned its
own studies on the effects of a trading system on E.U. member states
as well as the effects of different options associated with a trading
120
The E.U. also consulted U.S. advisors with direct
scheme.
experience in trading systems throughout the ETS approval process.121
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 252-53.
Kruger & Egenhofer, supra note 8, at 4-5.
Id.
See, e.g., David Harrison, Jr. & Daniel B. Radov, NAT’L. ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS.,
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE INITIAL ALLOCATION MECHANISMS IN A EUROPEAN UNION
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As a result, the E.U. did take lessons from previous emissions
trading systems when designing the E.U. ETS. Even though certain
elements of the E.U. ETS have been criticized, there are a number of
components which have been applauded. For example, the ETS has
extremely tough penalties which make the rights associated with
allowances more powerful. The U.S. experience with the SO2 trading
program likely influenced the E.U. to include strong penalties in its
ETS.122 Part of the success of the SO2 trading program in the United
States is attributable to the strict compliance components of the
123
The European Commission even cited the compliance
system.
record of the U.S. SO2 program in its draft directive for an ETS.124
In addition, the E.U. has wisely chosen to continue its evaluation
of the ETS after the program’s implementation.
The E.U.
commissioned McKinsey & Company and Ecofys to monitor and
review the program during the first two years of operation.125
Recently, those companies released the results of a survey which ran
from June to September of 2005 and involved “517 companies,
government bodies, industry associations, market intermediaries and
NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations).”126 The survey results
127
demonstrated that the E.U. ETS is impacting corporate behavior.
They also showed that the participants were most interested in the
long-term variables of the ETS, including the setting of caps and
allocation rules into the future.128 However, there was no consensus
among participants about the best approaches regarding those
alternatives.129
In November of 2006, the European Commission released a
report with a preliminary review of the ETS program since its
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS ALLOWANCE TRADING SCHEME (2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/allocation.pdf; P. Capros & L. Mantzos, THE
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF E.U.-WIDE INDUSTRY-LEVEL EMISSION TRADING TO REDUCE
GREENHOUSE GASES (2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/climate_
change/primes.pdf.
121. Wettestad, supra note 20, at 16.
122. Christiansen & Wettestad, supra note 14, at 11.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. McKinsey & Co. & Ecofys, REVIEW OF E.U. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: SURVEY
HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/highlights_ets_
en.pdf.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 3.
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inception.130 The Commission found that ninety-nine percent of firms
had fulfilled their emissions reporting requirements for 2005
emissions and that the emissions of greenhouse gases were lower than
expected in the first year of the program.131 At the same time, the
commission recognized that the certainty and predictability of the
program needs to be improved and that there needs to be more
stakeholder involvement.132
In response, the E.U. established a separate working group to
133
The working group will
examine the E.U. ETS in greater detail.
consist of “experts from the commission, member states, academics,
134
industry, and the NGO community.” The working group will solicit
input from interested parties, utilize reports from member states on
their ETS experiences, and consult other outside recommendations.135
It will be focusing primarily on four topics. First, the working group
will investigate whether the ETS directive should increase its scope to
include additional industrial sectors and/or greenhouse gas
136
emissions. Second, it will conduct a complete reassessment of the
NAPs and their impact on the consistency within the market.137 It will
consider the option of instituting a single cap that would apply to all
138
The working group will also explore whether
member states.
granting allowances for five-year periods creates enough certainty for
potential investors.139
Third, the group will consider whether
monitoring and compliance should be more consistent between
140
Finally, the
member states in order to improve harmonization.
working group will study the option of linking the ETS to other
trading schemes as well as whether the ETS should continue to

130. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: Building a Global
Carbon Market – Report Pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 2003/87/EC, COM (2006) 676 final
(Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/com2006_
676final_en.pdf.
131. Id. at 3. The report noted that the decrease in emissions could reflect actual reductions,
but that they may also reflect an over-estimate of baseline emissions. Id.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 6.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 7.
137. Id. at 7-8.
138. Id. at 8.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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recognize credits under the Kyoto Protocol.141 The conclusions of the
working group will be translated into legislative proposals and
142
applied to the third phase of the ETS.
The E.U. has also completed a final regulatory impact
assessment for the E.U. ETS in compliance with the Better
Regulation Initiative and under guidance from the European
143
The assessment
Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines.
considers the uncertainties of the E.U. ETS as well as the major
benefits and costs of the program. The assessment concludes that the
benefits of the program adequately justify the costs.144
To be sure, the E.U. did not conduct as much regulatory analysis
as agencies in the United States usually do when they issue new
regulations. In particular, the E.U. did not consider regulatory
alternatives in conducting its assessment of the costs and benefits. It
also did not integrate as much public participation. 145
Returning to the influence of politics, the question remains
whether the E.U. maintained the correct balance between political
gains and environmental effectiveness. It could be argued that
politics may have allowed the E.U. to achieve the most environmental
gains possible at the time. Section III described the confluence of
factors that played into the E.U.’s decision to charge ahead with
emissions trading. It may be that all those factors together created
the “perfect storm” of opportunity for the E.U.. At any other time,
an ETS may not have had such broad political appeal or the ability to
pass muster with all the E.U. member states. But, in truth, it is still
too early to make a sweeping statement. The possibility remains that
the E.U. ETS may flounder and ultimately fail as a solution to rising
global greenhouse gas emissions.
Even so, the E.U. has conducted an adequate assessment of
emissions trading alternatives in order to justify its actions under the
ETS. More importantly, the E.U. has continued to re-evaluate and
re-assess its ETS at every step. Even though the ETS contains a
number of flaws and will continue to experience set backs as it

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 2.
See PARL. EUR. DOC. (SEC 791) (2005).
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, E.U. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME FULL REGULATORY
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 42 (2005), available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climate
change/trading/eu/pdf/euets-finalria.pdf.
145. Stephen M. Johnson, Economics vs. Equity II: The European Experience, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 417, 450-54 (2001).
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evolves, the E.U. has continuously recognized the inadequacy and
failings of the ETS as it has progressed. ’Further, the E.U. is making
strides to integrate stakeholder participation throughout the
assessment process.
Because the threats from global warming are so ominous, the
speed with which the E.U. initiated its ETS is less important than the
fact that the E.U. has taken action in the face of risk. The E.U. has
not jumped the gun. As the European Commission has stated, the
“cost of inaction on climate change potentially has much greater costs
than those associated with the implementation and running of the
146
E.U. ETS.” Of course, the gravity of the situation requires the E.U.
to take extreme care with any action. In a sense, the E.U. is
shouldering the burdens of the planet by investing resources into an
ETS promise. Even so, it was more important for the E.U. to
continue moving swiftly forward in the face of uncertainty rather than
freezing up against the enormity of the problem.
In the end, the entire experience of the E.U. ETS has spawned
interesting conclusions. First, politics in the E.U. to address climate
change can largely be attributed to reducing costs and increasing the
likelihood of adoption by heterogeneous member states. Throughout
the international negotiation process, the E.U. acted in a way that was
most advantageous for itself. Although the E.U. likely had in mind
the larger threat of global warming, it directed its policies in a way
that created economic and political gains for the E.U. Second,
political influences that focus on rent seeking may also result in
environmental success, especially when it comes to market
mechanisms. The flexible nature of cap-and-trade solutions may
allow governments to monitor programs and adjust them for changes
in both politics and the environment. Finally, political factors may
have different environmental outcomes depending on the varying
levels of risk Global climate change is a unique challenge. Although
the E.U. needed to act quickly to address climate change, such headstrong approaches may not be appropriate in all situations.
VII. CONCLUSION
The E.U. ETS is a revolutionary new program that will have farreaching implications for the world in its attempts to battle global
climate change. The development and evolution of the ETS has been
fascinating both because of the speed with which it happened and
146. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 143, at 42.
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because the E.U. has not consistently been a strong supporter of
market mechanisms. There are a number of reasons the E.U. may
have turned to emissions trading: because there was no political
support for a carbon tax, because there was strong industry backing
for a cap-and-trade system, because U.S. experience with market
mechanisms had already been successful, or because immediate
action was called for after the United States dropped out of Kyoto
negotiations.
Whatever the impetus, the E.U. ETS is one of the great
environmental policy experiments. Notwithstanding the remaining
hurdles, the E.U.’s experience demonstrates that international
environmental politics is a complicated process. To be sure,
policymaking is a delicate balance and it is not always wise to invest
in untested resolutions. However, the E.U. has been able to both act
quickly and to continuously readjust itself. Upon close examination,
it appears that the E.U. used trading negotiations to its advantage,
accepting trading as an alternative only when the E.U. had something
to gain from trading. Once the E.U. recognized the benefits of
trading, it was able to push the policy through rapid development and
initiation. Positive rent-seeking may have caused the E.U. to act
quickly, but the E.U. has taken precautions to better ensure that its
trading scheme will be environmentally effective. Considering the
extreme dangers of climate change, the E.U.’s level of commitment is
sufficient to justify speedy action.

